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Abstract 
There is vital role of corporate governance in the establishment of a competitive market; this is also suggested by 
the empirical studies that nations having good corporate governance practices tend to have strong growth in their 
corporate sectors. This study examines the impact of corporate governance on the performance of firm. The 
impact of Board attributes, Audit committee attributes and Ownership attributes was check on Return on Equity 
and Return on Assets of the Firms. The data related to the study was for Six years from 2009 to 2011 from 9 
commercial banks and 9 financial service companies, listed in Karachi Stock Exchange based on convenience 
sampling. There were total 108 panel observations. Multiple regression (Panel least square) was used to analyze 
the data.The results show that Board Independence has significant impact on Return on Equity of the firm while 
Board size and Audit Committee Independence have significant impact on Return on Assets.  
Keywords:Board size, Audit Committee Independence, Board independence, Ownership Structure, Ownership 
concentration, Corporate governance 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Corporate governance is a relatively new term in the debates, but the issues it addresses are as old as the business 
is. In recent years topics like effective corporate governance and accountability are of very much importance and 
subjects of heated debate especially after the global corporate scandals (Talimo, 2011). Corporate Governance 
describes the general principles to direct and control the business and management of the companies. There is 
vital role of corporate governance in the establishment of a competitive market; this is also suggested by the 
empirical studies that nations having good corporate governance practices tend to have strong growth in their 
corporate sectors. Some people think corporate governance as the most important issue that affect the 
performance of a corporate while others think that it is one of the most important issues that affects the corporate, 
implying that people mean different when they use the term corporate governance. The meaning of corporate 
governance varies from one phase to another phase of corporate life cycle. 
The improvement of corporate governance is one of the basic factors of strengthening the foundation 
for the performance of corporation in long term. However corporate governance is the issue and has been the 
subject of much debate. One should have a closer look at the essence of this debate to understand the reason of 
these arguments (Ibrahim et al, 2010).  
In Pakistan the framework of corporate governance was initially provided by institute of chartered 
Pakistan in 1998. The draft code of corporate governance was firstly issued by SECP on March 28, 2002 to all 
three stock exchanges of Pakistan to include the provisions of the code in the listing regulations of stock 
exchanges. Since corporate governance is a vast field and has importance in every organization. Being a student 
of management sciences, I feel the need of studying the impact of corporate governance on firm’s performance. 
Hence, I would like to investigate that does corporate governance play any role in the financial performance of a 
firm and whether is there any difference between the performances of the firm because of corporate governance. 
 
1.1 PROBLEM STATEMENT 
At present the idea of having adept corporate governance practices are neglected in the corporate sector of 
Pakistan. Hence it is important to study its impact on the firm’s performance. There may be serious 
consequences if it impacts on the performance of the firm.This study aims to investigate the impact of corporate 
governance on the performance of a firm. The study involves finding out the impact of Board Size, Board 
Independence, Audit Committee Independence, Ownership Concentration, Ownership Structure and Board 
Activity Intensity on Firm performance.  
 
1.2 RESEARCH LIMITATIONS  
1. This study is limited by the fact that the impact of corporate governance was checked by the attributes 
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of board of director, Ownership and Audit Committee. 
2. Sample is not large enough to generalize the observations to all Pakistani organizations. 
3. The time given for research is limited. It is not enough to conduct an in depth study because of which 
research quality may differ. 
4. The study focuses only on the financial services firms and commercial banks of Pakistan listed in KSE.  
 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The shock of the corporate failures has brought economic crises across the globe. Inept corporate governance 
standards were one of the reasons of these crises and have drawn the attention of investors towards the corporate 
governance standards (Shah, 2009). Ehikioya(2009) explained that the corporate governance structure comprises 
of ownership structure, board composition, board size and CEO duality. The corporate governance structure 
greatly influences on the performance of the firm.  
Concentration group of stockholders of the company has a role in controlling and directing the 
management to take biased decisions in the interest of a specific group. Furthermore the corporate governance 
allows the shareholders to direct the management to take keen interest for the betterment of the investment of 
shareholders (Rehman and Mangla, 2010).  
The CEO Duality has also been addressed in many studies. There has not been consistent relationship 
between CEO Duality and Firm’s performance Boyd (1994). Many studies provided the weak evidences that 
CEO Duality affects the long-term performance.  There is a chance of agency cost when CEO performs dual role 
(Baliga et al, 1995). The shareholder value can be enhanced by separating the two positions (Fama et al, 1983).  
Bhagat and Boulton(2008) reported that there is a relation between board size and performance of the 
firm. Ehikioya(2009) cited Yermack(1996) suggesting small board of directors results in better performance and 
argued that there is slow decision making when the boards are larger. 
Empirical evidences suggest that there is an inverse relation between the majority of executive 
directors and performance of the firm (You et al. 1986). Denis and Sarin(1997) found that companies that 
significantlyincrease the number of NEDs (non-executive directors) have betterreturns. Conversely,several 
studies provided the evidence  that organizations with large number of NEDsdo not perform better than those 
with relatively small number of NEDs (Leng, 2004). A study conducted by BhagatandBlack(1997) also suggests 
that the more the NEDs in the board the lower the returns. Theefficiencyof a board is dependent on the 
combination of executive and non-executivedirectors (Coleman, 2007). 
If the CEO also performs as the chairperson of the Board of directors in a firm it is called the dual role 
of CEO. Rechner and Dalton (1989) investigated the impact of CEO Duality on returns of the firm, on stock 
Exchange data. They reported that CEO Duality does not affect significantly on firms’ performance i.e. returns. 
The results indicated that firm having dual role of CEOs have lower returns. Some other researcher like 
Donaldson and Davis (1991) also investigated the impact of dual role of Chief Executive on firm’s return and 
they found the contradictory results to those found by the earlier. Some Empirical evidences suggest that the dual 
role of Chief Executive can positively impact on companies returns in case of different industries.  
However, Beluga, Moyer, and Rao (1996) reported that there is unresponsiveness to variations in a 
companies’ leadership structure; they did not report any evidence of performance changes due change in the role 
of Chief Executive. 
Empirical results regarding the association of ownership concentration and the profitability of the firm 
were inconclusive in the USA. No significant relationship found between ownership concentration and rate of 
returns in the study done by Demsetz and Lehn (1985).  In most of under developedeconomies evenPakistan; the 
closely held organizations control the economy. The dominant stockholder makes the decisions without bearing 
its full cost. There can be negative impact on firm performance if large family shareholders hold decision-
making power in the company. 
A number of studies in accountancy have concentrated on structure of audit committees, finding the 
reasons that affect the decision of creating an audit committee being responsible for auditing the financial results 
of the firm(Pincus, Rubarsky, and Wong1989). A number of studies have incorporated the evidences that the 
existence of an independent audit committee has the association with smaller number of problems of financial 
disclosure. Carcello and Neal (1999) concluded that a firm performing inefficiently is likely to have fewer 
chances to survive when the percentage of executive members in the audit committee is greater. Coleman (2007) 
measured the independence of the audit committee by taking the ratio of independent directors in audit 
committee over total number of directors in audit committee.  
Jensen (1993) has reported that one of the characteristic of the board of directors, which is relevant to 
the value of the firm, is the size of board. Organizational theory assumes that if there is a large number of people 
in groupsit takes relatively more time in making the decisions. The question about determining the size of the 
board is difficult to answer because its seems to be subjective. 
Lipton and Lorsch(1992) suggested an ideal board consists of 7 to 9members.Sanda et al (2005) 
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reported the relationship of small board with better firm performance. Coleman (2007) argument that large 
boards have less effectiveness and the cost of processing problems is also higher in large boards, which is one of 
the reason to make the decision making process difficult and relatively more time consuming. Firms having 
smaller boards tend to have enhanced firm performance.  
One of the important value-relevant attribute of the board is the intensity of its activity (Vafeas, 1999). 
The empirical evidences suggestthattherelationshipbetween frequency of board meetings and the performance of 
companyareinconclusive. Several empirical studies suggest that board meetings are beneficial to stockholders 
(Lipton and Lorsch, 1992). Conger et al (1998) suggest that board meeting frequency can be important source of 
improving efficiency of the board. It implies that frequent board meeting results in enhancing the performance of 
the firm; hence directors perform their duty in the interest of stockholders (Vafeas, 1999). Jensen (1993) 
believed that the routine work absorb more time of the meeting, limiting opportunity for Independent non-
executive directors meaningful interaction in controlling management. Jensen(1993) also suggested that boards 
should be more active when there is the crisis. The argument related to the relationship of number of meetings 
with the performance of the organization is still an open debate. (Coleman, 2007) 
 
Conceptual Framework: Impact of Corporate Governance on Performance of a Firm. 
 
 
3. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
3.1 TYPE OF RESEARCH: 
The study on “Impact of corporate governance on firm performance: a comparison between commercial banking 
and financial services sector” of Pakistan is a quantitative research.  
Information will be collected through secondary source i.e. the annual reports of the companies and their 
websites.  
 
3.2 UNIVERSE & TARGET POPULATION: 
Universe of population of study is all private companies in commercial banking sector and non-banking financial 
service sector in Pakistan. 
The target population is all listed companies of Karachi Stock Exchange in commercial banks sector and 
financial service sector. Presently 23 banks and 41 none banking financial service companies listed. 
 
3.3 SAMPLE SIZE& SAMPLING DESIGN  
The data related to the study has been for Six years from 2009 to 2011 from 9 commercial banks and 9 financial 
service companies, listed in Karachi Stock Exchange based on convenience sampling.For the study, non- 
probability sampling is chosen. In non-probability, the sampling has been done on convenience basis. 
 
3.4 QUESTION RAISING 
i. Whether the corporate governance of the company plays any role in performance of the company? 
ii. Is there any difference between the performances of commercial banks and financial service sector due 
to corporate governance practices? 
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3.5 HYPOTHESIS TESTING 
i. H1: corporate governance of the company plays a significant role return of a company over its assets. 
ii. H1: corporate governance of the company plays a significant role return of a company over its 
shareholders equity 
iii. H1: corporate governance of the company plays a significant role return of a company over its assets 
regarding different sub-sectors 
iv. H1: corporate governance of the company plays a significant role return of a company over its 
shareholder’s equity regarding different sub-sectors 
 
4. DATA ANALYSIS 
Table 1 shows that Return on Equity is significantly affected by Board independence as it has the highest t-
statistics of 2.32 where as other dependent variables like ownership concentration, Audit committee 
Independence, Ownership structure and Board Activity Intensity are not contributing significantly due to their 
low t-statistics. 
Table 2  shows that Return on Assets has been significantly affected by Board Size due to its t-
statistics of 3.23 (99% Significance Level) another element of corporate governance which is contributing to 
Return on Asset is Audit Committee Independence as its t-statistics is 1.95 (95% Significance Level). Other 
factors like Ownership Concentration, Ownership structure, Board activity intensity (SHA) and Board 
Independence are not much influential towards Return on Assets. 
When Industry wise dummy variable are introduced in the model, we can conclude that it is not 
significantly affected by independent variables, due to lower t-statistics, and again it is only Board Size which 
has significant effect on Return on Assets with t-statistics of 2.98. When industry wise dummy are introduced in 
model to check the effect on Return on Equity, we may conclude that it is only Board Independence, which has 
some effect on Return on Equity, other variable are not much contributing. 
 
Table 1 
Dependent Variable: ROE   
Method: Panel Least Squares   
Date: 11/20/12   Time: 18:48   
Sample: 2006 2011   
Periods included: 6   
Cross-sections included: 18   
Total panel (balanced) observations: 108  
     
     
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     
BS 4.145391 4.907465 0.844711 0.4002 
OC -2.496101 20.05918 -0.124437 0.9012 
ACI 76.37378 52.11137 1.465588 0.1458 
OS -12.83856 70.22780 -0.182813 0.8553 
SHA -25.72891 43.06752 -0.597409 0.5516 
BI -99.94053 42.95776 -2.326484 0.0220 
     
     
R-squared 0.061827     Mean dependent var 7.932118 
Adjusted R-squared 0.015838     S.D. dependent var 82.22618 
S.E. of regression 81.57243     Akaike info criterion 11.69481 
Sum squared resid 678714.3     Schwarz criterion 11.84382 
Log likelihood -625.5199     Hannan-Quinn criter. 11.75523 
Durbin-Watson stat 2.548710    
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Dependent Variable: ROA   
Method: Panel Least Squares   
Date: 11/20/12   Time: 19:26   
Sample: 2006 2011   
Periods included: 6   
Cross-sections included: 18   
Total panel (balanced) observations: 108  
     
     
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     
BS 0.089505 0.027701 3.231126 0.0017 
OC -0.070226 0.113227 -0.620224 0.5365 
ACI -0.575287 0.294149 -1.955766 0.0532 
OS 0.088833 0.396409 0.224095 0.8231 
SHA -0.123696 0.243100 -0.508829 0.6120 
BI 0.030195 0.242480 0.124525 0.9011 
     
     
R-squared 0.096180     Mean dependent var 0.058975 
Adjusted R-squared 0.051875     S.D. dependent var 0.472874 
S.E. of regression 0.460446     Akaike info criterion 1.340709 
Sum squared resid 21.62504     Schwarz criterion 1.489716 
Log likelihood -66.39827     Hannan-Quinn criter. 1.401126 
Durbin-Watson stat 1.413367    
     
     
 
Table 3 
Dependent Variable: ROA   
Method: Panel Least Squares   
Date: 11/20/12   Time: 19:27   
Sample: 2006 2011   
Periods included: 6   
Cross-sections included: 18   
Total panel (balanced) observations: 108  
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     BS 0.103009 0.034546 2.981809 0.0036 
OC -0.043034 0.118489 -0.363194 0.7172 
ACI -0.458847 0.317769 -1.443965 0.1519 
OS 0.120924 0.409600 0.295224 0.7684 
SHA 0.093078 0.323093 0.288086 0.7739 
BI 0.063467 0.258263 0.245745 0.8064 
BANK -0.435301 0.480814 -0.905342 0.3675 
FINST -0.448258 0.453231 -0.989029 0.3250 
     
     R-squared 0.105602     Mean dependent var 0.058975 
Adjusted R-squared 0.042995     S.D. dependent var 0.472874 
S.E. of regression 0.462597     Akaike info criterion 1.367266 
Sum squared resid 21.39959     Schwarz criterion 1.565942 
Log likelihood -65.83234     Hannan-Quinn criter. 1.447822 
Durbin-Watson stat 1.435900    
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Dependent Variable: ROE   
Method: Panel Least Squares   
Date: 11/20/12   Time: 19:28   
Sample: 2006 2011   
Periods included: 6   
Cross-sections included: 18   
Total panel (balanced) observations: 108  
     
     
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     
BS 5.444135 6.118207 0.889825 0.3757 
OC -1.763629 20.98475 -0.084043 0.9332 
ACI 61.19150 56.27790 1.087310 0.2795 
OS -30.42327 72.54155 -0.419391 0.6758 
SHA -43.74221 57.22082 -0.764446 0.4464 
BI -90.14404 45.73924 -1.970825 0.0515 
BANK 3.263309 85.15380 0.038323 0.9695 
FINST 21.50166 80.26867 0.267871 0.7894 
     
     
R-squared 0.072198     Mean dependent var 7.932118 
Adjusted R-squared 0.007252     S.D. dependent var 82.22618 
S.E. of regression 81.92748     Akaike info criterion 11.72073 
Sum squared resid 671211.2     Schwarz criterion 11.91941 
Log likelihood -624.9196     Hannan-Quinn criter. 11.80129 
Durbin-Watson stat 2.550979    
     
     
5. CONCLUSION 
The findings of this research suggest that there is significant effect of board independence on Return on Equity. 
While other factors such as ownership concentration, Audit committee Independence, Ownership structure and 
Board Activity Intensity are not effecting significantly as their t-statistics are low. Return on Assets has been 
significantly affected by Board Size due to its t-statistics of 3.23 (99% Significance Level) another element of 
corporate governance which is contributing to Return on Asset is Audit Committee Independence as its t-
statistics is 1.95 (95% Significance Level). Other factors like Ownership Concentration, Ownership structure, 
Board activity intensity (SHA) and Board Independence are not much influential towards Return on Assets. 
When Industry wise dummy variable are introduced in the model, we can conclude that it is not significantly 
affected by independent variables, due to lower t-statistics, and again it is only Board Size which has significant 
effect on Return on Assets with t-statistics of 2.98. When industry wise dummy are introduced in model to check 
the effect on Return on Equity, we may conclude that it is only Board Independence, which has some effect on 
Return on Equity, other variable are not contributing When industry wise dummy are introduced in model to 
check the effect on Return on Equity, we may conclude that it is only Board Independence, which has some 
effect on Return on Equity, other variable are not contributing When industry wise dummy are introduced in 
model to check the effect on Return on Equity, we may conclude that it is only Board Independence, which has 
some effect on Return on Equity, other variable are not much contributing.  
 
6. FUTURE RESEARCH 
As corporate governance is a big topic there are different aspect which can be investigate through a more 
comprehensive study employing the data from more companies and in different industries. Furthermore there 
may be more factors which may have significant impact on the firm performance. These factors can be 
investigated in the further research.  
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